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ABSTRACT
Providing relevant recommendations requires access to user
profile data. Current social networking ecosystems allow
third party services to request user authorisation for access-
ing profile data, thus enabling cross-domain recommenda-
tion. However these ecosystems create user lock-in and so-
cial networking data silos, as the profile data is neither port-
able nor interoperable. We argue that innovations in recon-
ciling heterogeneous data sources must be also be matched
by innovations in architecture design and recommender meth-
odology. We present and qualitatively evaluate an archi-
tecture for privacy-enabled user profile portability, which
is based on technologies from the emerging Web of Data
(FOAF, WebIDs and the Web Access Control vocabulary).
The proposed architecture enables the creation of a universal
“private by default” ecosystem with interoperability of user
profile data. The privacy of the user is protected by allowing
multiple data providers to host their part of the user profile.
This provides an incentive for more users to make profile
data from different domains available for recommendations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.3 [Information Search and Retrieval]: Information
filtering; H.3.4 [Systems and Software]: Distributed sys-
tem
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1. INTRODUCTION
Personalised recommendations have proven themselves to
greatly enhance the user experience of searching, exploring
and finding new and interesting content [8] on social websites
like Facebook1 and Last.fm2. However, in order to provide
an attractive and successful recommendation service, appro-
priate data and knowledge is required, depending on the
domain of the service and the algorithm used [2].
While most recommender systems collect profile data from
their own users, an alternative approach is to share user pro-
file data among an ecosystem of sites, thus enabling cross-
domain personalisation. In such an ecosystem one site typi-
cally has the role of the hub site, which provides the main en-
try point for the whole ecosystem and stores the user profile
data. Prominent social networking sites like Facebook and
Twitter3 are such central hub sites. Third party services can
provide value-added and personalised services for the user of
an ecosystem. Examples include TweetMeme4 which shows
the most popular links on Twitter, and the Flickr5 integra-
tion for Facebook which posts pictures uploaded on Flickr to
the user’s Facebook activity stream. Users stay in control of
their profile data, as their profile is stored on the central hub
site and the user can specify which services can access their
profile data. If a service e.g. spams the user with messages
then the user can revoke access for the service.
While the creation of such ecosystems provides powerful







between different services, it also leads to user lock-in and
social networking data silos: User profiles are not portable
between systems, connecting to users from a different sys-
tem is not possible and the user can not evade changes to the
terms of service. In this paper we propose an alternative:
Instead of creating ecosystems around closed networking si-
los, we propose to create ecosystems around portable user
profiles. These user profiles can be moved between social
services or they can be hosted by the user themselves.
We present an architecture which describes how to com-
bine existing infrastructure of the Web of Data and existing
standards for decentralised identity management in order to
achieve privacy-enabled user profile portability. Building on
work by Hollenbach, Presbrey and Berners-Lee [14], our ar-
chitecture describes how to combine Linked Data, WebIDs
and the Web Access Control (WAC) vocabulary: Linked
Data [5], and the Friend-of-a-Friend (FOAF) and Semanti-
cally Interlinked Online Communities (SIOC) vocabularies
allow the description of domain independent user profiles [6].
WebIDs [19] securely connect a user identity to the informa-
tion in a user profile and can be used for authenticating a
user. The WAC vocabulary [14] allows the user to authorise
third party services for accessing different parts of his profile
information.
This architecture allows users to benefit from the privacy
that is provided by centralised and closed social networking
ecosystems as well as from the portability that is provided
by the decentralised and open Web of Data. User profiles
and activity stream data can be securely shared with any
third party that supports the architecture. User profiles
can be hosted by social networking sites or they can be self
hosted by the user. There is no lock-in to any specific social
networking site or ecosystem. We provide a qualitative eval-
uation of the presented architecture based on the evaluation
framework for privacy-enhanced personalisation suggested
by Wang and Kobsa [20]. In addition we describe how the
architecture applies to a use case from the e-Health domain.
The contributions of this paper are: (i) an architecture
for privacy-enabled user profile portability, (ii) a list of the
requirements for privacy-protected sharing of profile data for
the purpose of data mining and recommendations, (iii) a use
case which shows how to apply the described architecture to
the e-Health domain.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
introduces the emerging Web of Data and the challenges for
recommender systems in acquiring user profile data. Section
3 describes related work in identity management, distributed
social networks and privacy-enhanced personalisation. Sec-
tion 4 lists the requirements for our architecture based on
an existing evaluation framework for privacy-enhanced tech-
nologies. Section 5 describes our architecture and the roles
and communication pattern of it’s participants. We also
describe its application in an e-Health use case. Finally sec-
tions 6 and 7 provide a discussion of our work and a conclu-
sion to the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In order to provide an attractive and successful recom-
mendation service, sufficient data and knowledge is required.
While the Web of Data can provide sources of data and
knowledge for recommendation services, it currently does
not provide the means for creating an ecosystem around
privacy-enhanced and portable user profiles.
In this section we first explain why acquiring data and
knowledge for a recommender system is a challenge. Then
we introduce the Web of Data as a source of public data and
knowledge. Then we show that users have the expectation
of privacy, when it comes to making their profile available
on the Web. As the Web of Data currently does not provide
the means for users to control access to their profile data,
an important incentive for users in sharing their profile data
is missing.
2.1 The challenge of acquiring data for rec-
ommendations
Recommender systems require three components to pro-
vide recommendations [8]: (1) background data, which is
the information the system has before the recommendation
process begins, (2) input data, which is the information pro-
vided about the user in order to make a recommendation,
and (3) the recommendation algorithm which operates on
background and input data in order to provide recommen-
dations for a user.
In order to provide relevant recommendations appropriate
background data is required, depending on the domain of the
service and the algorithm used [2]. The high entry barriers of
providing good recommendations are caused by the problem
of acquiring data and knowledge to provide the background
data for the recommendation algorithm.
The data acquisition problem [2] is characterised by three
complementary challenges: (a) The new item problem: To
provide good recommendations for any item, the recommen-
dation algorithm needs information about the item. If a new
item has been added, then no information about user pref-
erences has been collected for the item. This makes it chal-
lenging to provide collaborative recommendations for new
items. (b) The new user problem: In order to personalise
the recommendation, the recommendation algorithm needs
a user profile. For collaborative recommendations new users
are a challenge because the user has no profile of prefer-
ences connecting him to items. Together, the new-item and
new-user problems are known as the ramp-up or cold-start
problem. (c) The sparsity problem: If the number of ratings
is low compared to the number of items in the background
data then it will be hard to match other users or item pro-
files, and this will lead to ineffective recommendations.
In addition, for knowledge intensive recommendation ap-
proaches, knowledge bases fitting the recommendation sce-
nario are required. This adds the knowledge acquisition
problem [8], which is characterised by the high effort of
knowledge engineering: In order to provide recommenda-
tions in knowledge intensive recommendation scenarios, a
knowledge base about the recommendation domain and the
users needs to be acquired.
2.2 The Web of Data as a data source for rec-
ommender services
The term Linked Data refers to a set of best practices for
publishing and connecting structured data on the Web [5].
Taken together, all linked data constitutes the Web of Data.
While the World Wide Web provides the means for creating
a web of human readable documents, the Web of Data aims
to create a web of structured, machine-readable data.
In order to acquire the necessary data and knowledge for
recommender systems, external data sources can be used.
The Web of Data can provide access to such external data
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Figure 1: Overview of Linking Open Data sources
as of July 2009 with source types shown
sources [13]. However, the Web of Data does not provide the
means for creating an ecosystem around privacy-enhanced
and portable user profiles. In other words the Web of Data is
“public by default”, whereas many users have come to expect
the privacy of a “private by default” medium. Because of
this, an important incentive for users to share their profile
data via the Web of Data is currently missing.
The Web of Data utilises technologies from the Semantic
Web technology stack: the Resource Description Framework
(RDF) provides a graph based data model and the basic, do-
main independent formal semantics for the data model [11];
the SPARQL Query Language allows querying RDF data
with graph patterns, and provides basic means for trans-
forming RDF data between different schemata. In addition,
technologies from the World Wide Web provide the funda-
mental infrastructure: Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)
are used to provide globally unique identifiers for the data,
and the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is used for ac-
cessing and transporting the data. RDF Schema and OWL
allow the definition of vocabularies, taxonomies and ontolo-
gies, which provide the basis for shared domain semantics
between applications.
In order to build a single Web of Data, all data providers
have to follow the same guidelines for publishing their data
and connecting it to other data sources. These guidelines
are provided by the Linked Data principles [5], which spec-
ify how to use the different standards of the Web of Data
together:
1. Use URIs as names for things (and e.g. persons, places).
2. Use HTTP URIs so that people can look up and access
those names via HTTP.
3. When someone looks up a URI, provide useful infor-
mation, using the standards RDF and SPARQL.
4. Include links to other URIs, so that data about more
things can be discovered.
The Linked Data principles have been adopted by an in-
creasing number of data providers, especially from the Link-
ing Open Data community project6, which makes free and
public data available as linked data. The nucleus of the
linked data cloud is formed by DBpedia7, which extracts
RDF from wikipedia topic pages, and thus provides URIs
and RDF data about topics from any domain.
Social websites provide a big contribution to the linked
data cloud, by making information about their users avail-
able. This data is modelled after the principle of object cen-
tred sociality [6]: persons are not only directly connected
to other persons, but also indirectly via objects of a social
focus. In this way a community is connected to each other
not only via direct links from person to person, but also
via their links to e.g. music from an artist. Such data uses
the Friend of a Friend (FOAF) vocabulary for describing
users and their connections to interests and other users, and
the Semantically-Interlinked Online Communities (SIOC)
vocabulary for describing user generated content on forums,
weblogs and Web 2.0 sites, as described in [6].
FOAF and SIOC provide the means for putting user pro-
files and data about object centred sociality on the Web of
Data. However this data is usually “public by default”, as
the Web of Data does not currently allow the user to specify
which services can access which parts of a user profile.
However, as the recent Facebook privacy backlash [12]
has shown, users are not comfortable with the assumption
that all of their profile data is publicly accessible. Facebook
launched in 2004 with a strong “private by default” policy,
however it tried to move away from this in 2010 towards
a “public by default” policy. This move caused a backlash
with many high profile users cancelling their account. This
led to Facebook reverting their policy and now suggesting
more private settings again. See [7] for more background.
In order to provide incentives for users to share their pro-
file with different recommendation services on the Web of
Data, it is necessary to provide the means for controlling
the access to the profile data. This will allow users to move
towards a “private by default” policy, ultimately leading to
more user profiles being available to recommendation ser-
vices.
3. RELATED WORK
Privacy and personalisation are currently at odds [20]. In
order to provide a personalised experience it is necessary
for a website to have access to data about that same user.
However users can feel reluctant in sharing their personal
data with a website, as they fear their data can be misused
or traded with unknown entities.
Different approaches to manage the identity and the pro-
file data of the user have been suggested both inside of the
recommender systems community as well as from the indus-
trial Web standards community in general. In this section we
will first provide a short overview of privacy-enhanced per-
sonalisation approaches. Then we will introduce the most
prominent current standards for identity management and
decentralised social networking.
3.1 Privacy-enhanced personalisation
According to Wang and Kobsa [20] the existing approaches





Pseudonymous personalisation allows users to remain anony-
mous towards a personalised system, whilst enabling the sys-
tem to still recognise the user in different sessions so that it
can cater to the user personally. This also allows the user
to keep different parts of his online activity on the same ser-
vice apart (e.g. professional use and private use), as used by
Arlein et. al [3].
Distributed personalisation, in which either the storage
of the user data is distributed or the computation of the
recommendation. This enables better privacy for the user,
as each user controls the storage and the distribution of his
own data. Miller et. al [18] propose a peer-to-peer algorithm
called PocketLens. The algorithm first aggregates data from
the direct neighbours in the P2P network and then generates
an item-to-item similarity model based on this data. Then
peers incrementally share the item-to-item model and use
this to update their own model. This model then can be
used to generate recommendations for a user.
Cryptography enhanced methods for personalisation treat
the privacy-preserving computation of recommendations as
secure multiparty computation problem, where users and
different websites jointly conduct computations based on
their private data without the need to trust each other. In
order to achieve this the user data can be transmitted in an
already encrypted state [9], it can contain randomised errors
which cancelled out during the computation, or it can use
obfuscation or aggregation to hide a single users preferences
amongst the data of a group of users [4].
Of these privacy-enhanced personalisation approaches, the
work of Arlein et. al [3] from 2000 is most similar to our
contributions. Arlein presents an architecture for so-called
“global customisation”, which enables third party services
(called “merchants”) to collect data about a user and share
it between sites using a “profile database”. Users are repre-
sented in the architecture as personas which are stored on
a “persona server”. Every user can have multiple personas,
and the privacy of the user is protected because the profile
database only knows about personas without being able to
link personas to real users.
While our architecture has similar goals in allowing the
sharing of user profile data for recommendations while main-
taining the privacy of the user at the same time, we use
different technologies for this which were not available in
2000. By combining existing standards and infrastructure
to achieve these goals our architecture can be easily inte-
grated into the emerging Web of Data from the start.
3.2 Decentralised social networking standards
Outside of research on privacy enhanced personalisation,
standards have been developed for identity management and
decentralised social networking. Some of these standards
such as OpenID are widely used by now, while other stan-
dards are missing industry adoption, depending on the ma-
turity of the standard. We introduce the most prominent in-
dustry standards for authentication, authorisation and pro-
file data exchange in the following.
OpenID8 is a standard for decentralised authentication
of a user. It provides a way to prove that an end user owns
an identity URL without passing around the password of
the user to a third party service. OpenID is completely
decentralised meaning that anyone can choose to be a third
party service (“consumer” in OpenID terminology) or hub
8http://openid.net/specs/
site (“identity provider”) without having to register or be
approved by any central authority. Users can pick which
hub site they wish to use and preserve their identity as they
move between hub sites. As of December 2009, there are
over 1 billion OpenID enabled accounts and approximately
9 million sites have integrated OpenID consumer support,
such as Google and Yahoo.
OpenID provides the means to decouple identities from
real users, thus enabling pseudonymous personalisation. How-
ever OpenID is not well suited for machine agents and it
requires a large overhead in terms of the number of HTTP
connections which are required to gain access to a secured
resource [19].
OAuth9 specifies a protocol for decentralised authorisa-
tion of resource access. It specifies how a user can authorise
a third party service (called “client” in OAuth terminology)
to access parts of his profile (his “resources”) on a hub site
(“resource owner”). Instead of using a user’s password to
access parts of his profile at a hub site, third party services
obtain access tokens which are used to access the protected
resources. In addition to removing the need for users to
share their password, users can restrict access to a limited
part of their data and they can limit access duration.
OAuth is used by two of the most popular current social
websites (Twitter and Facebook) to authorise third party
services for accessing data from user profiles. OAuth com-
plements OpenID, as it provides delegation of authorisation
on top of the authentication through OpenID identity URLs.
However this thight integration also means that OAuth re-
quires a multitude of HTTP connections, which will lead to
scalability problems for decentralised authorisation on the
Web of Data.
OpenID itself does not provide any mechanism to ex-
change profile information, although it is possible to link
an OpenID identity to a profile data such as a vCARD doc-
ument. However OpenID attribute exchange10 provides
a protocol accessing profile data and provides a data model
for storing it. The OpenID attribute exchange standard has
not reached industry wide adoption, as it specifies a very
limited vocabulary for expressing a user profile and it does
not allow easy extensions to this vocabulary.
4. REQUIREMENTS
In order to arrive at an architecture for privacy-enabled
user profile portability for the purpose of making recom-
mendations, we collected requirements for the architecture.
The requirements are based on the evaluation framework
for privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) by Wang and
Kobsa [20, 15]. We first outline their list of general privacy
principles and the main areas in which users have privacy
concerns. Then we describe our non-functional requirements
for the architecture which are informed by the emergence of
the Web of Data.
4.1 Privacy principles
As part of their evaluation framework Wang and Kobsa
identify [20] the main privacy principles which motivate the
creation of privacy enhancing technologies. These privacy
principles are grouped as follows:




These include anonymity, pseudonymity, unobservability, un-
linkability and deniability.
Privacy principles from privacy laws, regulations and rec-
ommendations. These principles have been identified from
a review of 40 international privacy laws, and they include
limiting the collection of data, specifying the explicit pur-
pose of the collection, limiting the use of the data for specific
functions of the service, and informing the user of onward
transfer of the data to third part services, as well as asking
the user for his consent.
Human-computer interaction for the purpose of enabling
privacy. These include asking the user for his privacy prefer-
ences, allowing the user to negotiate by giving him multiple
privacy choices and the usability of the service by e.g. not
requiring installation of new infrastructure software from the
user.
4.2 Privacy concerns
Wang and Kobsa also identify [15] the main privacy con-
cerns which users have regarding the impact of technology
on the previously identified privacy principles. The concerns
of users about their privacy fall roughly into three areas:
The protection of identity : Users want to control who can
identify them, or who can link their identities on the Web
back to their official and legal identity. This corresponds to
enabling and protecting the anonymity related principles.
Control over the user’s data: In addition to controlling
their identity, users value the ability to control who can ac-
cess which parts of their profile data. For our purposes this
not only includes mostly static information like name, gen-
der and location, but also the highly dynamic activity stream
of the user and all the multimedia resources associated with
the user. This area is affected by enabling and protecting
the privacy principles collected from laws, regulations and
recommendations.
Human-computer interaction: Different aspects of enabl-
ing the protection of identity and the control of a user over
his data depend on the user interface of a service. For in-
stance, by law a user needs to be informed of the data which
is collected of him, which is a task of the UI. In addition
the UI has the task to community all of the possible pri-
vacy settings without e.g. hiding some of them in a com-
plicated menu structure. This area is affected by enabling
and protecting the privacy principles collected from laws and
those principles collected from human-computer interaction
research.
4.3 Non-functional requirements
In addition to the requirements imposed by the privacy
concerns, we have identified non-functional requirements for
our architecture. While these do not directly impact the
privacy of the user, it is necessary to take them into account
to make large scale adoption of the architecture possible.
Universality: The World Wide Web was perceived to be
one universal space11, where any resource can be connected
to any other resource. However for user identities on the
current generation of social websites this is not true, as one
user can only be connected to other users from the same
social network. Therefore our architecture should enable
universality of user profiles.
Scalability: An architecture for portable user profiles should
scale well for the number of users in total, as well as for the
11http://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/Axioms.html
number of hub sites and third party services. Users might
have one or multiple profiles. Hub sites might be created
just for one user if the user decides to host his user profile
himself, or they might contain data from millions of users.
Third party services might access data from any number of
hub sites or individually hosted user profiles.
Reuse of infrastructure: Deploying an architecture for
portable user profiles should not depend on new backend
infrastructure or on new client software on the side of the
users. Ideally existing infrastructure from the World Wide
Web such as Web servers using HTTP and URIs should be
reused. In addition technologies from the emerging Web of
Data can be extended for user profile portability.
5. ARCHITECTURE
In order to enable users to share their profiles with differ-
ent ecosystems while maintaining their privacy at the same
time, it is necessary to define an architecture for privacy-
enhanced user profile portability. This architecture pre-
scribes the standards as well as the roles and the communi-
cation pattern between the different participants. By imple-
menting this architecture, all individual participants agree
on the same technical principles, which in turn allows the
architecture to guarantee the identified requirements on a
global level.
In this section we first describe the Semantic Web stan-
dards and technologies which provide the foundation for our
architecture. Then we describe the roles performed by par-
ticipants of the architecture and introduce a use case ground-
ing it in the e-Health domain. Based on the use case we
describe the required communication pattern of the partici-
pants, followed by a qualitative evaluation against the iden-
tified requirements from the previous section.
5.1 Foundation standards
Hollenbach, Presbrey and Berners-Lee [14] suggest using
FOAF, WebIDs and the Web Access Control (WAC) vocab-
ulary to enable access control in collaborative environments
on the Web of Data. This allows integrating with existing
infrastructure thereby extending the Web of Data in a nat-
ural way.
The FOAF vocabulary allows the description of domain
independent user profiles [6]. FOAF provides properties to
describe all of the details which are usually contained in a
social networking profile or on a personal homepage. In ad-
dition a FOAF profile provides a container for other informa-
tion from different domains. For instance, this information
could use the SIOC vocabulary to list the content which the
user has generated on his blog, on his twitter stream and
the comments on different forums.
WebIDs [19] securely connect a user identity to the infor-
mation in a user profile and can be used for authenticating a
user. A WebID consists of two parts: (1) an SSL certificate
which contains a link to (2) the URI from which information
about the user can be obtained. The data which is obtained
from the URI is associated in return with the SSL certifi-
cate, as it lists the public key which is associated with the
private key contained in the SSL certificate.
The Web Access Control (WAC) vocabulary [14] allows
the user to authorise third party services for accessing dif-
ferent parts of his profile information. Each private resource
is tied to an Access Control List (ACL) resource. The ACL
resource can say which agents or groups of agents have ac-
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cess rights to the resources it governs, so the content of the
ACL resource can be considered as a whitelist (i.e., “private
by default”).
Users are granted full access to the ACL resources for their
profile so users can read, write, and control their whitelists
as well as the profiles themselves. In other words, users
can update their profiles and they can also give third party
services access to all or parts of their profile data.
5.2 Roles
The interplay between FOAF, WebIDs and the WAC vo-
cabulary requires the participants to perform one of three
roles: profile storage services, data consumers and user agents.
Profile storage services roughly correspond to the hub
sites in current profile sharing ecosystems. They provide
the storage for the user profile or parts of it, and they se-
cure the access to the profile data by following the rules
from the ACL about a profile. In addition they provide a
user interface for changing and maintaining the ACLs from
the WAC metadata by e.g. adding or removing read rights
for data consumers. Profile storage services can be either
self hosted by the user or they can be hosted by a social
networking site.
Data consumers correspond to any type of third party ser-
vice which is accessing user profile data in current ecosys-
tems. Each consumer has its own WebID, which identifies
the service every time it is accessing profile data from a pro-
file storage service. This allows the storage to determine if
the access is granted to the consumer.
User agents manage the different identities of a user. Each
identity is represented by a WebID, which is used for au-
thenticating the user towards profile storage service or data
consuming services.
5.3 Use case: personal health records
In order to illustrate how the standards of FOAF, We-
bIDs and WAC vocabulary enable privacy preserving profile
portability, we will ground the architecture in a use case
from the e-Health domain.
The emergence of Personally Controlled Health Record
(PCHR) platforms such as Google Health12, Microsoft Health-
Vault13, and Dossia14 leads to “tectonic shifts in the health
information economy”[17]. PCHR platforms enable patients
to import and manage their health data, and third party ser-
vices to securely access it and to provide added value. For
instance, patients can get recommendations of clinical trials
matching their condition, or they can exchange experiences
with other patients having the same disease. However, while
being central hub sites, these platforms also contribute to the
data silo problem and the privacy of health data is required
to be protected by law.
In order to meet these requirements, our proposed ar-
chitecture can be applied to this domain, creating a Per-
sonal Health Application (PHA) ecosystem around porta-
ble health data without compromising privacy. As a result,
third party services like TrialX15 and PatientsLikeMe16 can

































Figure 2: Architecture of the use case
In this use case, the patient profile is divided into three dif-
ferent resources (Figure 2): (a) Public FOAF profile, which
is also used for WebID authentication and self hosted by the
patient. This resource contains the public key of the certifi-
cate and pointers to the other resources, as well as the same
kinds of public information social networking sites often pro-
vide, such as name, gender, and date of birth. (b) Private
Personal Health Record (PHR) hosted by a PCHR platform.
This contains the same kinds of information which would
traditionally be found in a patients’ medical record. This
includes a patients’ health conditions, medications, and lab-
oratory results. The PHR is described by using the Health
Level 7 Clinical Document Architecture (CDA), which is a
widely used standard for exchanging patient health data.
CDA specifies the semantics of PHR as well as the struc-
ture, so it can be converted into RDF triples and semanti-
cally queried [16]. (c) Private FOAF profile, which contains
a list of friends who share the same or a similar disease
with the patient. This patient-centered social network can
be used for exchanging experiences about the treatment or
the symptoms between patients having the same or similar
diseases. This resource is also self hosted by the patient.
The different profiles can be implemented either as sep-
arate URIs and documents, which are discoverable via the
main public profile, or they can be accessible via the same
WebID, depending on the credentials of the WebID associ-
ated with the requesting user [1].
As the PHR is a rich source of information about a patient,
it will be a valuable asset for third party services to provide
personalised information recommendations. For example, a
service similar to TrialX can utilise health data in the profile
to give the patient recommendations on which clinical trials
are matched to him/her. To this end, the patient has to
grant the service access to the PHR in his/her profile by
adding a new entry to the ACL.
In the same way, a service like PatientsLikeMe can gain
exclusive access to the private FOAF profile which contains
the social network of patients who suffer from the same or
a similar disease. This kind of service can then give recom-
mendations on care options based on the treatment of simi-
lar patients without compromising the privacy of the patient
(e.g., information about the disease will not be accessible to
the work related social network of the patient).
5.4 Communication pattern
In order for user agents, data consuming services and pro-
file storage services to participate in the architecture, they
need to interact with each other according to their role. In
the following we describe an example of the resulting com-
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munication pattern as applied to the use case in section 5.3.
The communication pattern is illustrated in figure 3.
1. The patient goes to the third party service using an
HTTPS connection. During the SSL handshake, the
patient sends his/her WebID to the service. The ser-
vice verifies the identity of the patient by comparing
the public key in the certificate with the one in the
public FOAF profile.
2. The third party service welcomes the patient, and asks
for permission to access the patient’s PHR.
3. When the patient say “yes” to the request, he/she is
getting sent to the PCHR platform wherein his/her
PHR resides, then the PCHR platform authenticates
the patient via WebID and authorises him/her to add
a new entry to the ACL for his profile.
4. The PCHR platform asks the patient to confirm the
new ACL entry, which specifies that the third party
service denoted by the user specified WebID can now
access to the patient’s PHR.
5. Then the patient confirms the creation of the ACL
entry.
6. When the third party service tries to access to the
patient’s PHR data, the PCHR platform verifies the
WebID of the consuming service and checks the ACL
of the patient’s PHR data. If the permission of the
consuming service to access the patient’s PHR data is
verified, access is granted and the consuming service
can perform read operations on the data.
7. After the service gets the patient’s PHR data, it com-
pares the patient’s health data with clinical trials and
recommends the matched ones to the patient.
5.5 Qualitative evaluation
In order to evaluate the presented architecture, we now
describe how it meets the identified requirements from sec-
tion 4:
Protection of identity: Users can choose to use multi-
ple identities, each identity being represented by a unique
WebID. Each time a user interacts with a data consum-
ing service his user agent can allow him to choose which
WebID to use. In this way pseudonymity, unobservability
and deniability of the user identity are supported. None of
the identities need to be tied to a real world identity, thus
supporting anonymity. Data consumers should not be able
to link user identities, however user profile storage services
need to be trusted in order to maintain unlinkability of user
identities. Self hosting of a user’s profiles however can im-
pact the protection of his identities negatively, if the server
can be easily linked to a real world identity.
Control over the user data: The user stays in control of
his profile data, as the portability of user profiles allows him
to move his profile freely between storage services or even to
host the storage of his profiles on his own server. Lock-in to
a specific ecosystem or to a specific storage service should
not be possible, as the open standards of RDF, FOAF and
SIOC are used for describing the profile.
Human-computer interaction: Services can provide an easy
user interface for managing the ACL of a user profile. A user
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Figure 3: Sequence diagram depicting the commu-
nication pattern between the user agent, the PCHR
platform and the third party service
interface example is given in [14]. The proposed architecture
does not require the user to install or understand new soft-
ware. WebIDs can be used in contemporary Web browsers
such as Firefox, which support the installation of user gen-
erated SSL certificates.
Non-functional requirements: The presented architecture
allows any user agent, profile storage service or data con-
sumer to participate in one universal ecosystem, as all par-
ticipants will support the same standards and implement the
same communication pattern. The architecture is scalable,
as there are no bottlenecks or central points of failure, due
to the decentralised nature of the used standards. For pro-
file storage and data consumption existing standards and
infrastructure from the World Wide Web and the Web of
Data, such as HTTP and RDF are reused, thus making fu-
ture adoption by service providers easy.
This shows that the proposed architecture allows us to cre-
ate an ecosystem in which users can protect their identity,
they have control over their own data and the interaction
with the technology is easily understandable. The architec-
ture also has the properties of universality, scalability and
reuse of existing infrastructure. This allows users to benefit
from an ecosystem which provides privacy and security while
enabling portability of user identities at the same time.
6. DISCUSSION
To be able to provide accurate recommendations by seam-
lessly combining multiple sources of information is a key
objective of recommender system research. However, it in-
variably raises questions about data ownership and control.
By seeking better data fusion techniques, are we tacitly ac-
knowledging that we will ride roughshod over user privacy
in order to build richer user models? Furthermore, we need
to ask who will own and control the user models and how
we may prevent them from being abused. The recent resis-
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tance to Facebook’s change in its terms of service suggest
that Web users are sensitive to how their data is used.
We argue that innovations in reconciling heterogeneous
data sources must also be matched by innovations in archi-
tecture design and recommender methodology. The problem
is simply not one of creating a richer, centralised database
on which to create innovative new models, but of design-
ing flexible recommender systems that can cater to differing
degrees of data access and control.
Previous research has established the importance of main-
taining user trust [10] for successful adoption of personali-
sation technology. To build systems in which engendering
user trust is a fundamental principle requires researchers to
solve the challenge of data integration for recommendation
systems by algorithmic, architectural and policy-based in-
novations.
In this paper, we do not address data integration by ex-
amining new data fusion techniques. Instead we point to
the Web of Data as an example of how heterogeneous data
sources can be linked by current standards. However, the
Web of Data still requires techniques to allow data providers
control access to their data. As such, our focus is a sim-
ple personalisation architecture, created from existing stan-
dards, that enables user profile portability and cross-domain
recommendation while also allowing the user control of his
data. The focus of current ecosystems is on locking data
into a central hub site, and not on empowering the indi-
vidual user. Our proposed architecture enables a universal
ecosystem which is built around the user profile, by speci-
fying an interoperable way to share and protect the profile
data at the same time. Extending the infrastructure of cur-
rent ecosystem is feasible, as our presented architecture nat-
urally builds on existing standards of the World Wide Web
and the Web of Data, such as HTTP and RDF.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we addressed the problem of preserving user
privacy while seeking to integrate multiple personal infor-
mation sources. The default architectural solution requires
a centralised hub with users reliant upon the good will of
the service provider to ‘do no evil’. We argue that in order
to maintain user trust and support the challenge of het-
erogeneous data integration must be addressed by algorith-
mic, architectural and policy-based innovations. As such,
we presented an architecture for privacy-enabled user pro-
file portability based on existing standards. We described
the requirements for privacy-enabled sharing of profile data
for data-mining and modelling. Finally, we illustrated our
approach with a use case from the e-Health domain.
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